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ABSTRACT
In 1981, as Sub-Saharan Africa continued in its downward spiral of
economic demise, the World Bank issued a major study on the causes of Africa's
economic woes and potential short-term steps to alleviate them. The World
Bank's Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action
(frequently referred to as the World Bank Report), has since become a focal
point for international debate about contemporary issues in African
development. In this paper, the authors dissect a number of the major
controversies engendered by the World Bank Report, by presenting and
evaluating the differences between the authors of the Report and critics of
the Report.
The authors discuss five different broad areas in which the World Bank
Report has been criticized. The first is its overall assumptions and
philosophy, which critics have argued is overtly Western-oriented and counter
to African goals of self-reliance. The second is the explanation presented by
the Report for the causes of Africa's economic crisis, focusing on policy
mistakes by African governments. The third area of criticism is the broad
macrostrategic prescriptions of the Report focusing on export-oriented
agricultural production and a restrained public sector. The fourth is the set
of specific policy interventions proposed by the Report, which put almost
exclusive emphasis on various price policy adjustments. The final area in
which the Report has been criticized is that of administrative feasibility,
whether a program such as that proposed can actually be implemented given the
sociopolitical realities of most Sub-Saharan African countries.
The authors conclude that, in. general, critics of the World Bank Report
have often overstated the problems in the document and have sometimes
misinterpreted what the Report actually says. On the other hand, several of
the points made by the critics highlight real flaws in the World Bank Report.
Most important among these are the Report's undue optimism about the
international trade environment and the liklihood for increased foreign
assistance to Africa from the industrialized countries, the tendency of the
Report to overgeneralize on both the sources of economic distress and
potential solutions, the underestimation of the negative impact of external
factors, and the Report's too narrow focus on trade and exchange rate policy
as the key to a short-term recovery strategy.
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RESUME
En 1981, alors que l'Afrique sud-saharienne a accentus sa perte de vitesse
Lconomique, la Banque Mondiale a publis les rfsultats d'une enquete importante
sur les causes de la crise conomique en Afrique et la possibilits de prendre
des mesures attenuantes d court-terme. Le d~veloppement acc6l6r6 en Afrique
au sud du Sahara, (souvent appels "le Rapport de la Banque Mondiale"), s'est
fait l'objet d'un drbat international concernant les problemes de
d'veloppement actuels en Afrique. Dans ce rapport, les auteurs dissequent
plusieurs controverses fondamentales engendrdes par le Rapport de la Banque
Mondiale, presentant et analysant les differences d'opinions des auteurs et
des critiques du Rapport.
Les auteurs discutent cinq aspects g~nsraux du Rapport qui ont et6
critiques. Premierement, les critiques du Rapport affirment que ses
suppositions et sa philosophie sont trop orientges vers l'Occident,
contredisant ainsi l'aspiration de l'Afrique vers l'autosuffisance.
Deuxiemement, l'explication of ferte par le Rapport vis-A-vis des causes de la
crise 6conomique en Afrique est trop ax~e sur des erreurs de politique
qu'auraient commises les gouvernements nationaux. Une troisieme objection
porte sur le caractbre g6nfral des recommandations macrostrategiques
concernant une production agricole orientte vers l'exportation et un secteur
public restreint. Quatriemement, les interventions tactiques propos6es par le
Rapport insistent presque exclusivement sur les divers ajustements de la
politique des prix. Cinquiemement, la praticabilit6 au niveau administratif
est discutable: serait-il possible de realiser un tel programme, 6tant donne
les r6alit6s socio-economiques de la majorits des pays de l'Afrique
sud-saharienne?
Les auteurs constatent que, en g6nsral, les critiques du Rapport de la
Banque Mondiale ont souvent exagers les problemes du document, et qu'ils ont
parfois mal interprftr son vrai contenu. Par contre, plusieurs arguments
of ferte par lee critiques font ressortir des points faibles, dont les plus
importants sont lee suivants:
D'abord, le Rapport fait preuve d'un optimisme peu justifi6 en ce qui
concerne le climat du commerce international et la probabilit& d'une
augmentation de l'aide provenant des pays industrialis~s. Ensuite, le Rapport
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tend A faire trop de gfin~ralites quant aux causes de la crise g&onomique et
aux solutions possibles. D'autre part, le rapport sousestime 1' impact n~gatif
des facteurs extfirieurs. Enf in, le Rapport insiste trop sur la politique du
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THE WORLD BANK AND ITS CRITICS: THE CASE OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
INTRODUCTION
As African nations moved towards independence in the late 1950's and early
1960's, an atmosphere of heady optimism engulfed the continent. Kwame Nkrumah
declared, "Seek ye first the political kingdom, and all other things will come
to ye," reflecting the general belief among Africa's first generation of
leaders that once the banners of the departing colonial powers were taken
down, Africa would be able to speedily take its place as a dynamic part of the
growing world community. Much of this enthusiasm was shared by Western
foreign policy and development officials. While the hard core of departing
colonial officers predicted stagnation and disarray, American aid officers and
the World Bank, both turning their attention to Africa for the first time, saw
tremendous opportunities for development given the buoyant international
market for primary commodities, the release of energy. inspired by
decolonization, and the pragmatic developmental orientation of Africa's
leaders. This shared optimism about Africa's future created the basis for a
cooperative relationship between newly independent African states and the
international community, which was reinforced by Africa's dire shortage of
trained manpower and capital.
But Nkrumah's dictum proved to be tragically mistaken. Capturing the
political kingdom, except in southern Africa, was a relatively easy task;
making that independence meaningful through successful national integration
and effective economic development has proven to be particularly difficult.
In the 1960's, while the per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of
Sub-Saharan African countries did grow at one and one-half per cent annually,
this lagged substantially behind the 3 and one-half per cent annual average
growth rate in developing countries taken as a whole and was also lower than
the two percent average rate achieved by low-income countries. 1
Politically, in the late 1960's, Africa was rocked by a series of military
coups and the beginning of what Nelson Kasfir has called the general
"shrinking of the political arena," as African leaders sought to more
effectively consolidate their political power.2
1
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The Demise of Optimism
If the 1960's were a disappointing decade for Sub-Saharan Africa, the
1970's were catastrophic. While a small minority of African states were able
to sustain economic growth -- Nigeria and Gabon through skyrocketing oil
revenues; Kenya, Ivory Coast and Malawi by maintaining high levels of foreign
investment; Tanzania, at least until 1978, through a combination of high
levels of foreign aid and austere consumption -- the overall picture was
bleak. In aggregate terms, per capita GDP stagnated, despite the fact that
domestic investment levels, if anything, increased. Hit hardest of all was
the agricultural sector, where per capita aggregate output declined at 1
percent per annum. Agricultural exports, which had expanded by 2 percent per
year in the 1960's declined at an ever increasing pace, so that by the early
1980's, exports were lower than 1960 levels.3 The combination of increasing
food imports due to falling agricultural production, lower export earnings and
the dramatic oil shocks of 1973-74 and 1979-80 generated severe balance of
payments crises for virtually all oil-importing African states and drove a
substantial number into a vicious cycle of stagnation and decline. Many
states' political and organizational structures, fragile at the start, were
further weakened under the impact of economic and fiscal crises.
The failure of African states to achieve the optimistic goals that were so
widely shared at independence has generated a double retreat towards
pessimism, both by Africans and by Westerners involved in African
development. The World Bank's World Development Report 1980 stated that
Sub-Saharan Africa "has the most disturbing outlook" of any region in the
Third World, and is likely to face further decline in per capita income in the
1980's.4 Within Africa, the retreat into pessimism has particularly focused
on the obstacles within the existing international order that African states
see as blocking development opportunities. The "dependency" perspective,
inspired by Latin American writers such as Andre Gunder Frank and Raul
Prebisch, 5 has become the new orthodoxy in Africa although it is expressed
in a number of forms and to differing degrees. Within African governmental
circles, this perspective has been most cogently expressed in the preamble to
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the Lagos Plan of Action, approved at the 1980 meeting of the OAU Heads of
States and Governments:
(T)he unfulfilled promises of global development strategies...have
made the continent stagnate and become more susceptible...to the
economic and social crises suffered by the industrialized
countries... Faced with this situation, ... we resolve to adopt a far
reaching regional approach based primarily on collective
self-reliance. 6
The demise of optimism and, especially, Africans' growing distrust towards
the international environment, served to partially erode the basis for
cooperation between African states and international development agencies.
This was despite the fact that international agencies, especially the World
Bank and the International Labor Organization, were influenced by some of the
same intellectual trends. The rise of the "Basic Human Needs" approach to
development within these agencies in the 1970's was their response to the
empirical and intellectual currents of the time. In fact, international
agencies became increasingly involved in Africa throughout the 1970's,
shifting the focus of their activities away from "traditional" modern sector,
infrastructural, industrial and export-generating projects towards rural-based
poverty-alleviating and food-generating projects. Despite international
agencies' increasing concern with Africa and their shift in focus towards the
rural areas, these sectors have continued to stagnate.
Origins of the Agenda
This was the context in late 1979 when the African Governors of the World
Bank, alarmed at the growing balance of payments crisis and the seemingly
dismal prospects for African development, asked the Bank to prepare a special
report reviewing the causes of Africa's economic malaise and offering
suggestions on appropriate measures to turn the situation around. The Bank's
response in 1981 to the African Governors' request was released under
conditions of emerging global recession and ever worsening economic conditions
across Sub-Saharan Africa. Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An
Agenda for Action (hereafter we shall refer to it as the Agenda) was developed
out of conclusions drawn from the macroeconomic evidence of twenty years of
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African independence and out of the experiences of the World Bank during that
period, especially the frustrations over the very limited impact of most of
the "Basic Human Needs" projects in the middle and late 1970's. The Agenda
located the roots of Africa's poor economic performance in a confluence of
factors including "structural" problems emanating from the environment and
historical circumstances and adverse trends in the international economy, but
paid special attention to policy errors by African governments. As a
short-term solution, the Agenda proposed a series of structural adjustments
centered around price incentives for exports and food crops, more effective
public sector management and greater utilization of private entrepreneurship.
The Agenda stressed that for this program to be feasible and effective, it
would have to be supported by an expansion in the quantity, and improvement in
the quality, of foreign assistance from the developed world.
The Agenda has served as a focal point for recent debate on a wide range
of issues within Africa's development quest. The often shrill tone of this
debate reflects the continuing tensions in North-South relations, the distrust
of international financial institutions growing out of the "dependency"
world-view, and the growing frustration at the continuing economic
disintegration in much of the continent among all those concerned with African
development. But, as Robert Browne and Robert Cummings have recently noted,
beneath the heat of the debate, many of the critics of the Agenda agree with
much of what the World Bank says; in many cases the differences are over
"emphasis rather than substance." Given this ambiguity in the debate
provoked by the Agenda -- the often emotional and polemical tone masking what
are, in some cases, much more subtle distinctions -- it is useful to examine
systematically the key issues which separate the Bank and its critics. That
is the main purpose of this paper.
Categorizing the Critics
Critics of the Agenda are often lumped together into one group. But, in
fact, criticism has come from varying perspectives and frameworks. Critics
can be roughly divided into four categories. First are African critics, who
take issue with the seeming ambivalence of the Bank to African priorities of
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self-reliance as set out in the Lagos Plan of Action. They have responded
both individually and in Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An
Assessment by OAU, ECA and ADB Secretariats (which we will hereafter refer to
as the Assessment). They are joined by non-Africans who have been favorable
towards Southern perspectives in the North-South debate. These critics are
well-represented in the January 1983 issue of the Institute of Development
Studies Bulletin entitled, "Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa:
What Agendas for Action?" These critics approach the report from the
perspective of "dependency" theory, finding fault with both its basic
philosophy and its prescriptions. Within this group a distinction can be
drawn between criticism that is a priori and basically ideological in
character (such as that of Timothy Shaw8) and criticism that is derived from
an examination of the facts (such as most of the IDS group).
A second group of critics are more sympathetic with the Agenda's broad
approach, but disagree with particulars in the analysis and ensuing
recommendations of the Agenda. They contend that the Agenda is too narrowly
focused and optimistic, and that it sometimes fails to adequately analyze
policy recommendations for technical accuracy, basing recommendations on
fallacious economic reasoning. The proposed reforms would, therefore, fail to
achieve their purpose, and might even cause more damage than progress.
Kenneth Shapiro's "The Limits of Policy Reform in African Agricultural
Development" is a representative of this category, as are some of the authors
in the IDS Bulletin.
The third group of critics broadly agree with the Agenda's analysis and
its macroeconomic proposals. However, they criticize what they see as the
Agenda's naivete about political and administrative constraints which could
render recommendations inoperable. This critique is well-articulated in David
Leonard's "What is Rational When Rationality Isn't?". Joel Barkan also
creatively addresses this issue.
Finally, there are conservative critics for whom the Agenda is a document
of "paternalistic liberalism." Donor states should not continue to devote
ever greater resources to African development, nor should they impose
paternalistic conditions on these transfers. This point of view, though
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rarely articulated, was expressed by Peter Kilby in his paper, "External
Factors in African Development," presented at the Michigan State University
conference on the World Bank's Agenda. It is also reflected in the opposition
of the United States Government to fully refinance the International
Development Agency (IDA), the "soft-loan" window of the World Bank, upon whose
resources many Sub-Saharan African states depend.
For purposes of this paper, we have grouped the different criticisms of
the Agenda into five broad categories:
(1) At the philosophical level, many have claimed that the Agenda's
approach is dogmatically laissez faire, and that Western-based market
assumptions and models are inappropriate and ineffective in Africa;
(2) Critics question the Agenda's analysis of the root causes of African
economic difficulties, which placed particular emphasis on mismanagement
and an overgrown public sector;
(3) Controversy has also arisen over the macrostrategic prescriptions
advocated in the Agenda focusing on export-oriented agricultural
production and restrained public sector activities. Such prescriptions
are accused of being at odds with policies promoted in the Lagos Plan of
Action;
(4) Microeconomic prescriptions of the Agenda are criticized for narrowly
focusing on price incentives as a solution to the ailing agricultural
sector to the exclusion of other solutions which could potentially
ameliorate performance;
(5) Finally, critics maintain that the Agenda falls short in providing a
program which is feasible in the context of Africa's political and
administrative structures. For such an agenda to be useful, they contend,
it must be implementable, an issue largely ignored by the World Bank's
staff.
Each of these categories will be examined in some detail before we
conclude with an overall discussion of the Agenda's place in the evolution of
thinking about economic development in Africa.
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THE AGENDA'S PHILOSOPHY AND BROAD APPROACH
Research and analytical work on the Agenda was led by Elliot Berg, known
for his neoclassical free-market approach to development issues. The document
was thereafter edited at the World Bank, then in the process of a leadership
transition with A.W. Clausen replacing Robert McNamara as President.
Concomitant with this change in leadership was a rethinking of Bank
priorities and methods in the direction of what has been termed
neoliberalism. A major element in the philosophical debate about the report
concerns the exact status of this neoliberal approach and its relationship
both to prior Bank thinking and to African states' long-range goals as
articulated in the Lagos Plan of Action.
Although the Agenda explicitly recognizes and accepts African goals of
national self-reliance and integrated development, it considers these to be
long-range goals that will only be achieved through accelerated growth,
reestablishment of export earnings in those commodities in which African
countries have comparative advantage in international trade, and more
efficient utilization of resources which can best be achieved by giving more
play to the market as an allocative mechanism.
This approach has led many critics to contend that the Agenda springs from
a dogmatic, almost theological bias in favor of free trade, private investment
and the price mechanism that has been inspired and imposed by the
industrialized countries, especially the Reagan Administration in the United
States. Not only is this approach seen to be inherently procapitalist and
antisocialist, but it is seen as both incapable of effectively dealing with
the economic problems facing African countries while serving to rationalize
and legitimize continued opposition by the industrialized countries to a
fundamental reordering of North-South relations.
Stephany Griffith-Jones describes the Agenda's presentation of policy
recommendations "as if there were a 'correct' body of theoretical economic
thought, rooted firmly in empirical evidence, which formed the basis of its
proposals."9 Many critics point to this self-assuredness in the Bank's
proposals as a denial of the potential for workable solutions along other
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ideological lines. But at the same time the Agenda is accused of being
dogmatic, it is also criticized for being ambiguous and inconsistent. The
Agenda does have its "hard" and "soft" moments, at times appearing to confirm
the critics' accusations while at other times making them appear overstated.
For example, in its discussion of the public sector, the Agenda fluctuates
between advocating reduction of public sector role and advocating increasing
its efficiency. Our point is that while the Agenda clearly has a perspective
-- neoliberalism -- it is much less certain that its authors are as dogmatic
and inflexible as critics suggest. Nor is it clear that neoliberalism is as
inherently antisocialist as critics mantain. The use of market and price
mechanisms within an overall socialist framework has an honorable heritage in
socialist economic thought going back to Oscar Lange and running through the
Liberman reforms in the USSR and current trends in Hungary, the People's
Republic of China and other socialist states. Indeed, in recent years, the
World Bank has been involved in programs in several of these countries with
the goal of increasing economic efficiency.
The State and The Market
In raising the issue of the role of the market in African development, the
Agenda has contributed to a long-standing and very interesting debate. David
Lamb, in his recent book, The Africans, chastised those Western observers of
Africa who feared the expansion of communist influence on the continent by
pointing out that African societies are highly entrepreneurial, possess
vibrant markets and are dependent on trade with the West. Thus, they are
unlikely candidates for penetration by communist ideologies.10 Lamb
undoubtedly has a valid point, but he misses the broader ambiguity towards the
market in Africa. While markets in Africa are dynamic, and while virtually
all studies have emphasized the "rational" responsiveness of African peasant
producers to market signals, African governments and intellectuals often
express a deep-seated antimarket mentality. This is derived from the fact
that Africa's governing stratum is drawn from the intelligentsia and the
bureaucracy rather than from any economic elite, that capitalism and the
market are often equated with colonialism and external control, and that
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policymakers -tend to view the market as an obstacle in their efforts to direct
the process of economic development rather than a tool in these efforts.
The Assessment's critique of the Agenda's discussion of the need for an
expanded private sector reflects this perspective. The Agenda, it argues,
focuses on shortcomings of the public sector, many of which are valid and
indicates areas for improvement, yet fails to outline the dangers and
constraints of the private sector and the reasons for public sector
intervention in the past. The "profit motive" which directs the private
sector, the Assessment states, often ignores and confounds the broader
interests of society, particularly issues of distribution and equity. 11
This argument is also made by several of the contributors to the IDS
Bulletin. In general, these critics assume that the public sector plays a
redistributive role while admitting that this may be at the partial expense of
efficiency and growth. But is this the case? The Agenda's argument, while
somewhat implicit, is not simply that the public sector orientation of African
governments has slowed growth, but that its impact on equity and
redistribution has often been perverse; that is, that while African
governments expanded their public sectors to promote redistribution, the
result has been the opposite. The Agenda's argument against the public sector
in Africa is an exact parallel of that made against mercantilism by Adam Smith
in The Wealth of Nations. 1 2  Public sectors, according to the Agenda, have
not promoted redistribution at the expense of growth; they have produced
inefficient, overprotected enclaves of privilege. In particular, they have
benefited urban consumers at the expense of rural producers. To the extent
that the main thrust of the Agenda's prescriptions would shift urban-rural
terms-of-trade in favor of the latter, they would serve to promote equity in
this relationship.
David Leonard, in his critique of the Agenda, takes the question of the
relationship between markets and states in Africa to another plane. Leonard
agrees with the Agenda's broad critique of the performance of Africa's public
sectors, but feels that it misses a more important point. The overexpansion
and misdirection of Africa's public sectors does not reflect "a mistaken
understanding of economic rationality, but a correct appreciation of still
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more fundamental and pressing political and social rationalities."13 For
Leonard, then, the debate between the Agenda and its African critics about the
potential viability of expanding the role of the market at the expense of the
state is, in a fundamental sense, unreal. To the extent that both sides
assume "purposive economic rationality," they ignore the social and political
imperatives that the African context will inevitably engender.
"Basic Human Needs" and the Agenda
As mentioned, a major element in the debate about the Agenda's broad
approach is its relationship to the "Basic Human Needs" themes that came to
prominence in the World Bank under Robert McNamara. Critics of the Agenda
differ among themselves on this issue. The more radical critics who have
always been dubious of the Bank (among them Manfred Bienefeld), have
characterized the Agenda as offering the same bad advice as before. 1 4  On
the other hand, most of the contributors to the IDS Bulletin see the Agenda as
marking a fundamental shift in Bank outlook and a return to the policies of
the pre-McNamara period. Philip Daniel writes,
Concern for reduction of inequalities, provision of basic needs, and
alleviation of absolute poverty appear to have fallen in the Bank's
ranking of priorities. Equity and distribution concerns have been
supplanted by a re-emphasis on growth.15
Is Daniel correct? There is no question that the Agenda accurately
reflects a shift in the operations and tactics of the Bank. The emphasis on
structural adjustment and macroeconomic policy differs from the project
orientation of both the McNamara and pre-McNamara periods. But there are
important continuities in the Agenda to the broad goals of the "Basic Human
Needs" approach. Most basic is the focus on the rural areas and on increasing
small-holder productivity. Poverty in Africa is predominantly rural; an
economic strategy that focuses on small-holder agriculture as does the Agenda
cannot be fairly accused of ignoring the alleviation of poverty.
The point here is to see the Agenda as a response to the Bank's
experiences in attempting to implement the rural projects of the 1970's. As
stated in the Agenda and numerous other Bank project analyses, the emerging
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consensus among project staff was that the success or failure of projects was
substantially dependent upon the macroeconomic and organizational contexts
largely independent of the projects themselves. Thus, the Agenda's focus on
the need for policy change and for redressing what it sees to be an imbalance
between public and private sectors occurs within an overall strategy that
retains the rural and small-holder productivity enhancing goals of the "Basic
Human Needs" approach. A second area in which the Agenda demonstrates
continuity with earlier themes is in advocating a greater role for small-scale
entrepreneurs. This is very much in the tradition of a number of World Bank
and ILO reports of the 1970's that argued for allowing greater play for the
"informal sectors" within African economies.16 Overall, then, it is not
correct to characterize the Agenda as rejecting those themes within the
McNamara Bank that sought to make African development more broad-based and
equitable. The Agenda does, however, implicitly disagree with the manner in
which the Bank attempted to achieve its goals in the 1970's and puts far more
stress on policies aimed at increasing output and redressing balance of
payments crises.
The Agenda and the "Lagos Plan of Action"
The final issue separating the Bank from its critics in the area of
philosophy and general approach is whether the Agenda and its proposals are
consistent with Africa's long-range goals of "collective self-reliance" as
articulated in the Lagos Plan of Action. The World Bank, both in the Agenda
and in other statements and articles (including one by Callisto Madavo), has
argued that the Agenda and the Lagos Plan are complementary, with the former
dealing with short- to medium-term responses to the immediate economic and
fiscal crisis, and the latter dealing with the long-term transformation of
African economies.17 Many critics disagree. The OAU/ECA/ADB Assessment,
for example, states, "the goals, objectives and characteristics of the
strategy contained in the (Agenda) are in many ways inconsistent with those of
the Lagos Plan of Action.,,1 Shamsu Mustapha of the Sierra Leone Ministry
of Finance argues similarly.
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On the face of it, the critics have a strong case. As Robert Browne and
Robert Cummings write,
While the (Agenda) is busy laying out prescriptions for getting
Africa back on to an efficient export-led growth path, the Lagos Plan
is exhorting its constituency to break away from this discredited
path and strike out in a new direction. 1 9
There is no question that the two documents are based on differing economic
perspectives, divergent views of the way in which the international economy
works, and different ideas about what development in Africa entails. On the
other hand, it is our feeling that critics have often overstated the
inconsistency between the two documents. The Lagos Plan is not geared to the
short-term problems of African development; nor is it really programmatic in
any meaningful sense. What it represents is an attempt by African leaders to
forge some rough consensus on what a preferred future for the continent would
look like and on the absolute necessity for cooperative efforts far more
successful than any so far undertaken in order for those goals to be at all
attainable. 2 0 The Agenda, on the other hand, attempts to propose a strategy
through which African nations, with assistance from the international
community, can get back on their feet. We agree with Browne and Cummings, who
after stressing the differences between the Agenda and the Lagos Plan,
conclude,
If the (Agenda) assists Africa in buying the time needed to prepare
itself for the full implementation of the Lagos Plan, and the
Africans do in fact use this time for that purpose, then in
retrospect the two documents will be seen to have made complementary
contributions towards the goal of Africa's economic development. 2 1
WHAT WENT WRONG? THE AGENDA'S EXPLANATION
All observers agree that Africa's economic crisis has been caused by a
complex mix of historical factors, population pressure, geographic and
climatic elements, wasted resources, short-term external shocks,
terms-of-trade deterioration, lack of skilled manpower, misguided policies,
political upheavals, and bad luck. The Agnd is significant in the special
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emphasis it puts on domestic policy inadequacies in the explanation of
Africa's economic crisis and in the very limited role it accords to
international factors such as terms-of-trade deterioration and protectionism
in industrialized countries. The Agenda, in addition, finds the large and
rapidly expanding African public sectors to have been a drain on vital
resources and thus a constraint on more rapid growth.
Many agree with the Bank that policies have disadvantaged both exports and
agriculture, albeit for the accomplishment of other development priorities.
Few argue with the Bank's assertion that populations are expanding too rapidly
to be productively absorbed in many African states. Yet the Agenda's causal
analysis has generated sharp debate, focusing largely on two elements: (1)
Were domestic or international factors more at fault for the present
difficulties? and (2) What role did the public sector play in reinforcing
economic disequilibrium?
International Factors in Africa's Crisis
Critics have reacted most strongly to the Agenda's discussion of what it
sees as the limited importance of external pressures, such as international
inflation, recession, and high oil prices. The Assessment, while
acknowledging that domestic policies and structures must be improved, argues
that external factors have been more detrimental to Africa in the 1970's. It
states that by failing to discuss overprotected international marketing
structures, the Agenda does not give a complete picture of adverse economic
forces at work in Africa. Instead, by focusing solely on domestic price
policies, the blame is laid at the feet of African leaders alone. The
Assessment counters by insisting that:
Particularly since 1974, (adverse trends in Sub-Saharan Africa)
include "stagflation" in the industrialized countries, higher energy
prices, the relatively slow growth of trade in primary products, and
adverse terms-of-trade, especially for copper and iron ore. 2 2
In particular, critics feel that the Agenda understates the role of
terms-of-trade deterioration as an explanation. Part of the difference
between the Bank and its critics concerns the time period involved. The
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Agenda bases its analysis on data up to 1979. Critics often include later
years. There is no question that the period since 1979 has seen a drastic
worsening in the terms-of-trade for African commodities. Nor is there doubt
that the terms-of-trade for mineral producers have radically deteriorated
since 1970. Indeed, if the dramatic increase in the mid-1970's of the
international price of several tropical beverages is excluded, then the
overall terms-of-trade picture becomes more negative. David Wheeler, in a
computer simulation, recreated the trade environment of the 1960's for the
1970's and found that ouput levels were significantly higher. 2 3
Reginald Green makes this further argument in putting more emphasis on
external factors:
Broad uniformity of unsuccess across strategy and policy differences
are critical in considering causes...Evidence that the basic causes
of most economic crises in Africa are probably external is reinforced
by national data...It does cast grave doubts on analyses placing
primary responsibility on particular African policies. 2 4
Green emphasizes correspondence between dates of major international shocks
and African difficulties. Many African states successfully rode out the oil
shock of 1973-74, recovering with the entire global community in 1976-77.
However, after the shock of 1979-80, no such global recovery took place --
evidence, says Green, that a sick international economy proved contagious for
Africa.
But is the "uniformity of unsuccess" so broad as Green suggests?
According to the FAO, six Sub-Saharan countries (Kenya, Malawi, Swaziland,
Cameroon, Ivory Coast and Rwanda) achieved better than 3 percent annual
increases in agricultural output in the 1970's, while a dozen countries had
less than 1 percent annual increases.25 Given high rates of population
growth, even these six "successes" are marginal, but they do challenge Green's
assertion of uniformity of outcomes (which, by the way, the Agenda tends to
slip into as well).
If the Agenda errs on the side of giving too little credence to external
factors, many critics go too far the other way. The fact is that in the
1970's Africa lost substantial market shares in virtually all of its major
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internationally-traded commodities. Overall, its share of developing
countries nonfuel exports plummeted from 18.6 percent to 9.2 percent. 26
Part of this was due to slow growth of international trade in those
commodities that Africa exports as compared to those exported by other
developing regions, but most was loss of market share due to neglect of
exports, since all exporters face the same market conditions for each
particular commodity.
Ernest Wilson presents a balanced view of both internal and external
factors that have contributed to Africa's economic woes. He rightly points
out the unfortunate tendency for each side to blame the other and absolve
itself of responsibility. Wilson does stress that oil-importing African
countries were particularly hurt by the rise of OPEC. Looking at energy
markets, he writes:
In Africa, more so than for any other region of the world, the
relevant organizations were hard pressed to adjust to the brutal
maelstrom of the boom and bust fluctuations of the oil market...The
Bank Report did not devote sufficient attention to the devastating
impact of these fluctuations on Africa. 2 7
The magnitude of stress placed on institutions and scarce resources by
energy demands is largely ignored by the Agenda, argues Wilson. He gives data
that 75-90 percent of Africa's commercial energy demand is supplied by oil,
forcing states to devote huge amounts of foreign exchange to cover those
rising expenditures.28 Equally difficult has been the structural adaptation
undergone by African governments to cope with such shocks, continues Wilson,
including increased reliance on external borrowing and reliance on
transnational oil firms.
An Overexpanded Public Sector?
Debate has also been generated about the Agenda's assertion that an
overly-expansive, inefficient and largely unproductive public sector
contributed substantially to Africa's economic woes. Philip Daniel takes
issue with the Agenda's analysis:
Treatment of (the public sector) is based less on economic research
and analysis than on generalizations from the observation of
political and administrative processes in selected cases and
countries. 29
16
Christopher Colclough, concurring with Daniel, points out that the Agenda
fails to compare public sector spending in Africa with other regions. Backing
his argument with data from the World Bank's World Development Report 1982, he
states:
The statistical evidence on government spending available in the
Report itself provides no basis for the conclusion that the rapid
expansion of government activities has resulted in slower growth in
Sub-Saharan African countries than would otherwise have been the
case. 3 0
Colclough points out that African countries spend no more on the public sector
than do industrialized countries as a percentage of GDP.
At one level, the critics make a valid point. The Agenda's treatment of
the public sector is not fully empirically-based and overgeneralizes.
Colclough's data on comparative expenditure do not reveal African states to be
"large" in comparison to other regions. But that begs the question. Do the
critics really wish to argue that African public sectors have performed well?
Certainly, among political scientists who have studied development
administration in Africa, there is an overwhelming consensus that performance
is very poor. African governments might not be bigger than others, but
they do tax the producers of exports at a much higher rate than governments in
other developing areas and they clearly undertake tasks that they can't
perform.
Critics are often ambiguous about the public sector. Green, for example,
writes that "there is no general case that African public sectors do too much,
in most cases they probably do too little."32 In comparison to the private
sector, the public sector isn't bad. Green continues:
Given the very late start, weak private domestic sector capacity,
poor domestic savings mobilization capacity, there is no general case
that the private sector could or would do better. 3 3
But, in his policy recommendations, Green moves much closer to the Agenda:
The case for change rests on the demonstrable fact that many African
public sectors do what they do very badly. . .public sectors. .. must
constrain what is attempted within the limits of the possible. 34
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Where the Agenda's overgeneralization does create a problem is in leaving
the impression that government agencies are running hopelessly amok. The
Assessment makes a valuable contribution in stating:
It is not certain that (the Agenda) has approached the problem
pragmatically...There are and have been cases where parastatal bodies
have been efficiently managed and have made a meaningful contribution
to development...This is a delicate area of public policy. 3 4
BROAD STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS
The Agenda is perhaps best known and most controversial for its broad
policy prescriptions. The proposed strategy has three major components.
First, agriculture is considered the sector with the highest short-term growth
and earning potential and therefore should receive the greatest attention in
resource allocation. Second, agricultural production for export must expand
to generate foreign exchange reserves. Finally, the private sector should
play a greater role in production and marketing. The Agenda states:
The agriculture-based and export-oriented development strategy
suggested for the 1980's is an essential beginning to a process of
long-term transformation, a prelude to industrialization. It is not
a permanent course for any country, but one that in Africa generates
resources more quickly than any alternative and benefits more
people. Without these resources, the foundations of future
development cannot be established. 3 5
The Primacy of Agriculture
The Agenda's recommendation that African countries give priority to
agriculture derives from its critique of import-substituting industrialization
(ISI) in Africa. This critique is never made fully explicit in the Agenda,
but is easily pieced together from various specific recommendations and
criticisms of existing policy. ISI, which has been undertaken by many diverse
African countries, Involves the erection of high tariff barriers and import
quotas, overvalued exchange rates in order to minimize the cost of imported
inputs to fledgling industry, low interest rates to reduce the cost of
investment, and licensing of producers to reduce competition. In addition,
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ISI is often accompanied by high wage rates and government efforts to control
the price of basic foodstuffs. According to the Agenda, the outcome of these
policies is an inefficient capital-intensive manufacturing sector with little
capacity for dynamic expansion and very limited "spread" effects. In
addition, these policies serve to discourage exports, limit savings, reduce
efficiency in investment, and discriminate in favor of the urban areas at the
expense of rural producers. The Agenda argues that industrialization in
Africa, based upon import substitution, has often been pursued at the expense
of undermining agriculture, where most of Africa's population is, which has
the greatest potential for increasing sorely needed exports, and where
Africa's food crisis must be faced.
Many critics of the Agenda agree with its emphasis on the agricultural
sector. The first priority of African states must be to increase food
output. Plus, in order to generate foreign currency for purchasing necessary
imports, states should capitalize on their most able sector -- agriculture --
later moving into expansion of an industrial base. According to Peter Kilby,
there is no inherent long run conflict between stimulation of agriculture and
industrialization. Using World Bank statistics, he states:
In agrarian economies, industrial growth does not occur at the
expense of agricultural growth, but because of it. The authors (of
the Agenda) are quite correct in arguing that those governments which
have squeezed agriculture in the cause of industrialization have
crippled the farm sector without any advance in manufacturing. 3 6
On the demand side, farm household income is crucial to purchase of
manufactures. On the supply side, agriculture influences the costs of inputs
in the manufacturing sector.
But some critics are unwilling to accept the primacy of agriculture in
development. The Lagos Plan states that "development of agriculture must be
integrated within the economic and social development processes." The
Assessment echoes this position, claiming that the Agenda fails to explicitly
recognize that self-sufficiency requires the development of an industrial
support structure -- one compatible with the natural resource base, human
needs and social/economic potential.3 Nor do African governments fully
share the Agenda's assessment of ISI. Certainly their defense partially
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reflects the fact that the groups favored by ISI often form a powerful
political coalition (generally including large sections of the government
itself) with a vested interest in maintaining ISI policies. Some critics also
fear that a rapid shift in policy away from ISI would lead to
deindustrialization, rapid inflation and further import dependence.39 While
caution in moving away from ISI is needed, it seems to us that those who
criticize the Agenda's emphasis on the need to prioritize agriculture, are on
weak ground. In order to make their case effectively, critics would have to
show why the Agenda's criticism of ISI is wrong, rather than merely stating
that industrialization is an integral part of development.
Exports and Development
More controversial than the Agenda's recommendation to emphasize
agriculture is the importance given to revitalizing exports, the
unfortunately-named export-oriented strategy. This strategy is
unfortunately-named because the assumptions the Agenda makes about the
potentials for exports to "lead" the development process are vastly overstated
and misread near-term trends in the international economy. Stephany
Griffith-Jones sees excessive optimism in the Agenda's predictions of growth
in world trade in the 1980's. Bank projections for world trade in the 1980's
predict a 2.9 percent per annum increase in Africa's 22 most important nonfuel
commodities, well above the 1970's projection of 1.5 percent. Minerals are
projected to increase by 5.8 percent per annum. 3 9 Griffith-Jones points out:
Such optimistic projections of growth are conducive to policy
recommendations which place greater emphasis on export-led growth
than the objective situation would recommend. 40
On the other hand, the Agenda's emphasis on export rehabilitation as a
priority is appropriate, independent of the international trade environment.
Many critics, while making the point about the Agenda's lack of realism
concerning export potential, go on to argue that export earnings either cannot
or should not be increased. As analysis, this is faulty; as advice, it is
disastrous.
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The Agenda points out that African economies are "uncommonly 'open,'
exports account for a significant share of marketed production, and imports
constitute a significant share of consumption."41 Given this openness, many
critics contend that increasing exports can only make African economies more
vulnerable to international fluctuations. But the "openness" of African
economies is by no means lessened by exporting less in the short-term, quite
the contrary. By failing to maintain export levels, African states have made
themselves more, not less, vulnerable to international fluctuations. The
bottom line is that production structures in Africa are highly
import-dependent. In order for development to take place, they will have to
remain so for a long time to come. The goals of long-range self-reliance
involve heavy import needs in the short- and medium-term. The key role for
exports is to pay for those needed imports. President Nyerere of Tanzania,
whose government neglected exports for many years in the name of
"self-reliance," learned this lesson the hard way:
There has been an increased rather than decreased dependence upon
imports to keep our economy running. Is this an unforeseen but
unavoidable result of development, which makes nonsense of -- and
therefore requires the amendment of -- our goal of self-reliance? Or
is it an inevitable phase in the development process which we have to
work through? I believe it is an inevitable phase for any developing
country. For a developing society is inevitably, and by definition,
more complex than a subsistence economy; it is less self-sufficient
and therefore every part is more dependent on another part. An
increased dependence on imports is indeed an inevitable result of
development. The realistic route to self-reliance is therefore the
rapid development of export capacity in order to pay for the needed
imports.42
Too many of the Agenda's critics have not learned that lesson. Several of
the contributors to the IDS Bulletin claim that the Agenda's advice to
increase exports is an example of the "fallacy of composition;" that is, while
it would be appropriate for one country, if all countries follow the advice
they will be worse off collectively because "an increase in production would
result in a fall in income...4 This assertion is not effectively
demonstrated, though data on market share and price elasticity of demand make
it plausible in the abstract for some commodities. But the point is that not
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all countries will expand exports, and that the alternative to re-emphasizing
exports is a further loss of market share that will further exacerbate current
difficulties. Critics seem to imply that Africa can maximize earnings by not
increasing volume, which is an irresponsible false assertion.
The Assessment takes the existence of a poor international trade
environment to argue that the Agenda is wrong in calling for increased exports.
The main argument for an export-oriented agricultural
policy...presupposes the availability of markets for the export
products and the capability of developing countries to compete with
developed ones...Neither of these assumptions can be taken for
granted. 4 4
The Assessment challenges these assumptions on several grounds. First, it
claims there is no evidence that prices for African commodities will continue
to rise sufficiently to compensate for inflation on manufactured goods, costs
of skilled labor, etc., so that terms-of-trade for African primary exports
will continue to deteriorate. Second, consistently expanding markets for
African commodities may not exist, thus increased production would imply
rising competition for existing market shares.45 In addition, reliance on
export-oriented agriculture will fail to develop high-level skills or
high-technology potentials nor will it enhance redistribution of wealth -- all
priorities of the Lagos Plan. Instead, the Assessment argues, export-led
growth leads to development of a small, high-income enclave sector which can
raise national GDP but perhaps not the general welfare of society. 4 6
The Lagos Plan stated Africa's alternative to export-oriented
agriculture: nationally integrated economies and regional cooperation aimed
at achieving self-reliant and self-sustained development. The Assessment
points out that economic growth should depend increasingly on internal stimuli
and gradual substitution of domestic for imported factor inputs. 47
Industry, allotted a marginal role by the Agenda as a long-term goal, is a
high priority of the Lagos Plan, which calls for the establishment of basic
industries in African states. The Assessment argues that the Agenda's export
orientation will only serve to pull Africa away from its ideal long-term
position by increasing external dependence and mono-crop production
structures.48
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While a number of these points have some merit, taken together they fail
to effectively challenge the Agenda's emphasis on export rehabilitation. The
Assessment does not directly confront the import dependence of contemporary
Africa. It also poses the outcome of an export-enhancing strategy in far too
narrow terms. Export production need not be limited to "enclaves", but can be
promoted among small-holders and become a focal point for generating
appropriate technological advances. Samuel Wangwe argues that an
outward-looking, foreign exchange-generating strategy can be complementary to
an inward-looking, foreign exchange-saving strategy. Export enhancement, he
writes, "may appear tantamount to maintaining the existing production
structures; this need not be the case if the foreign exchange so earned can be
used to enhance the structural transformation process."49 Wangwe's position
is very similar to that of Reginald Green who, while critical of the Agenda's
optimism about export prospects, shares its stress on the crucial need for
export rehabilitation.50
Controversy has also arisen over the potential of export crops to draw
productive resources (such as scarce labor, land and water) away from food
crop production. The Agenda, citing admittedly incomplete data, states:
Empirical evidence does not support the hypothesis that expanding
export production leads to declines in food production...Countries
that have been doing well in cash crop production have also been
among the most successful in expanding food production. 5 1
In general, one of the major goals of the Agenda is to contribute to
increasing Africa's food self-sufficiency. On the other hand, because of the
importance given to export rehabilitation, the Agenda allows that in
particular situations export promotion might take precedence over food
production. Several critics have taken this remark out of context and have
wrongly claimed that the Agenda is "hostile toward the number one African
priority of self-sufficiency in food."52 Green makes a more subtle
criticism, though his is also undoubtedly overstated.
At least on one plausible reading, (the Agenda) advocates rising
export crop relative to domestic food crop prices, and reducing
priority to food self-sufficiency...(Yet) speedy, smooth shifts from
food to exports are unlikely. Bad years for domestic food crops, and
years in which food prices explode globally are likely to
occur...Acceptance of an exports strategy would probably be a recipe
for starvation. 53
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The Role of the Private Sector
Finally, the Agenda calls for a shift from public sector activities in
productive fields to private sector initiative. Colclough sees two problems
arising from the Agenda's proposals. First, most government activities, if
suspended, would not be picked up by the private sector, or would be taken
over by foreign firms. Second, long-term projects, especially industrial,
could not be assumed by the local population, short on both resources and
skills.54 Thus, the alternative to state services and enterprises may often
be structures which are weak and manipulable, declares Manf red Bienefeld not
what is intended in a free-market system. 5 5
The Assessment takes a similar stance:
The indigenous private sector was rarely ever in a position to play
an active role in development, especially in the modern sector.
Skilled manpower was concentrated in the public sector, resources for
projects were directly or indirectly dependent on government
initiative; information was largely more accessible to the
government; and finally the overnment was organized, but the
indigeous private sector was not. 6
But what the Assessment describes as the causes for the large public sector,
weak private sector situation seems more to be the consequences of that
situation. Similarly, while Colclough and Bienefeld focus on areas of
potential concern, the areas in which the Agenda sees the private sector as
playing a key role -- agricultural marketing, transportation, retail commerce,
construction contracting -- are all areas in which foreign capital is unlikely
to be interested and in which the growth of parallel markets in many countries
indicates indigenous entrepreneurs already available to pick up these
activities.
David Leonard, while agreeing in principle with the Agenda's desire to
encourage private initiative, feels that the World Bank's antipublic sector
stance is impractical given the political realities of Africa. Rather than
seeking the impossible goal of dismantling the state, "the priority" should be
"to redirect its activities into areas that combine some economic returns with
high political payoffs."5 The Assessment takes a similar stance, stressing
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the need "to make the public sector more efficient and more development-
oriented rather than to reduce its size." 57
Critics are correct to point out the importance of making the public
sector more efficient. But given the budgetary crises that most African
states face, the need for paring back what the public sector does to conform
better with government priorities cannot and should not be avoided. Those who
propose increasing efficiency as an alternative to selective cutbacks have
offered a false dichotomy. Rather than alternatives, they are both necessary
components of a single process.
What Role for the International Community?
While the main thrust of the Agenda's strategic recommendations are
addressed to African governments, there is also a broad set of recommendations
for donors: doubling of the total volume of aid, a shift from project to
program support, less restriction on supporting local and recurrent costs,
less direct monitoring, more flexibility of support through the framework of
structural adjustment lending. At one level, these recommendations are
consistent with long-standing African demands for both more aid and greater
flexibility in methods. But critics of the Agenda fear that the main
implication for foreign assistance programs will be to make them conditional
on African governments' acceptance of the strategy proposediin the Agenda.
This raises the issue of the status of the Agenda's recommendations.
Does the Bank consider its strategy for reversing lagging development
"correct" or simply another element in a continuing dialogue? This will be
illustrated by the types of conditionalities imposed, linking structural
adjustment to international financial support. Critics fear that the Agenda
is outlining a new set of conditions which must be met, including exchange
rate realignment, food subsidy reduction, shrinking public sectors, and a host
of potentially volatile policy shifts. 58  Kilby describes the costs involved
for African governments if conditionality based on the Agenda's approach is
imposed:
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The task allotted to African governments is to (a) install a
thorough-going regime of market-clearing prices, (b) contract the
scope of state enterprise, and (c) improve public administration.
The assignment for the international community is to double the
already high aid level and refine the techniques of aid
implementation. 5 9
A right-wing critic, Kilby shares a distrust of conditionality with the
left-wing. Conditionality, argues Kilby, is "a type of soft paternalism,"
attempting to impose Western ideology and policies on Africa's leaders. To
avoid paternalism, Kilby argues, solutions to African problems should emerge
from within Africa and be based primarily on domestic resources and commitment
to development.
Several critics have pointed out that the Agenda is substantially overly
optimistic in its expectations of donors. Griffith-Jones argues that a number
of the Agenda's policy recommendations, such as lower tariff barriers, can
only be justified in the context of larger aid inflows. 6 0 In many ways, the
Agenda's recommendations imply a radical shift in the nature of foreign
assistance. As Philip Daniel says, "the proposals of (the Agenda) present
considerable difficulty for bilateral donors." 61 It is undoubtedly the case
that the leverage the Bank has over donors is far less than that over African
governments through conditionality. This, in turn, raises further questions
about conditionality and the Agenda. The Agenda presents its two sets of
policy prescriptions as fully interdependent. That is, structural adjustment
by African governments is only viable in a context of expanded assistance;
expanded assistance will be forthcoming only on the basis of commitment to
structural adjustment. In the absence of donor commitments along the lines
suggested in the Agenda, where does that leave conditionality?
SPECIFIC POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Poor performance in the agricultural sector, the anticipated "engine of
growth" of African economies, spurred the development of a set of specific
economic policy recommendations by the World Bank designed to ameliorate
conditions and encourage increased production in food and export crops. The
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Agenda advocates an improved incentive structure through reform of pricing
policies and marketing structures and more effective provision of inputs.
Restructuring price incentives is presented as the most necessary short-term
goal, given "the almost overriding importance of producer prices in affecting
production levels, often cutting across the quality of technical packages and
extension services." 6 2
Getting the Prices Right
The Agenda emphasizes three specific policy changes. First, lover
taxation of agricultural products in order to increase effective prices for
producers, which would, in turn, provide incentives for farmers to increase
production. Second, realignment of the exchange rate through devaluation in
order to raise the value of exports, allowing higher returns to those who
produce for external markets. Devaluation would also raise the price of, and
lower demand for, imported cereals, thereby enhancing demand for
domestically-grown crops. Third, the Agenda argues that governments should
raise prices paid to producers to the level of cross-border and black market
prices, a policy which would encourage increased production for domestic
markets.
Critics question the Agenda's proposals on a number of grounds. Some have
argued that the Agenda's emphasis on price policy as a cause for lagging
agricultural output and overall growth is overstated and not sufficiently
demonstrated. Specifically, Philip Daniel argues that price incentives may
not remove the constraints most influential in farmer decision making. In
Africa, Daniel states, structural, not price, constraints -- especially land
shortage, poor climate and lack of access to markets -- must be overcome to
encourage increased production. If these structural constraints cannot be
rectified, price incentives will have little effect on output levels.
6 3
Daniel's point is only partially valid. While the Agenda's analysis on
the impact of price policy was not convincingly argued, recent World Bank
studies, especially Ram Agarwala's "Price Distortions and Growth in Developing
Countries," which is summarized in the World Development Report 1983, make a
convincing argument on the link between ptices and growth. 64
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Kenneth Shapiro makes a strong point in arguing that price policy reform
may have a more limited impact than the Agenda suggests. He questions the
Agenda's claim that pricing reform, particularly reducing export taxes, would
provide adequate incentives to raise output significantly. Using World Bank
data, he shows that a 50 percent decline in the tax rate on exports would
result in a 25 percent approximate rise in producer prices. This 25 percent
increase, given an elasticity of supply response of 30 percent, would result
in less than a 10 percent increase in output, but would involve a 45 percent
loss of tax revenues.65 This tradeoff may prove very difficult to many
African states whose budgetary earnings are substantially dependent upon
agricultural taxes. Furthermore, a smaller revenue base would limit the funds
available for infrastructural development, improved health and education
facilities, and other important nonprice incentives.
Other political consequences of the Agenda's microeconomic proposals must
also be considered. Food prices are important to governments concerned with
the urban poor and an urban-based public sector. Realignment of subsidized
food prices has been the cause of urban unrest on several occasions, and is
therefore a controversial policy. Thus Shapiro states that given these two
constraints -- low elasticity of supply and difficult political trade-offs --
price incentives may be of limited economic value and political viability.
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But Shapiro and others have overstated their case. In several countries,
Tanzania and Madagascar among them, government-set prices were so distorted
and state marketing boards so inefficient that parallel markets dominated
official ones, creating a political and economic incentive for reform.
Initial results of a World Bank-supported liberalization of the rice market in
Madagascar (which involved allowing the market to set prices and free
competition in marketing) have shown both more domestically-produced rice
available to urban consumers at lower prices and a reduction in regional price
differences from those holding when the government attempted to enforce a
unique panterritorial price. While Green defends African governments'
utilization of panterritorial pricing against the Agenda's criticism with
reference to the Tanzanian experience,6 Tanzanian researchers have
substantiated the Agenda's point that panterritorial pricing generates
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perverse incentives for producers and increases the likelihood of inefficiency
in marketing. 6 8
Exchange Rate Policy
Perhaps the most controversial of the Agenda's specific policy proposals
is its call for substantial devaluation of African currencies. African
governments have been hostile to devaluation because they fear its short-term
costs, both economic (inflation, lowered real wages for urban consumers of
imports, inimical to ISI) and political ("I4F riots," perception of ceding of
sovereignty), while they are dubious about its longer term benefits. The
Agenda, however, sees overvalued exchange rates "at the heart of the failure
to provide adequate incentives for agricultural production and for
exports., 6 9 Critics have argued, correctly, that the Agenda's discussion of
exchange rates is too narrowly focused and apolitical. Devaluation, to be
successful, must switch internal terms-of-trade in favor of agriculture.
Christopher Colclough writes that devaluation will not have its intended
effect if "nominal wages are allowed to move upwards to compensate for the
inflationary impact of exchange rate movements."70 Since the Agenda was
issued, African governments have been much more active in exchange rate
devaluation, but the results have been very limited due to factors such as
those raised by Colclough. The World Bank, in its recent "Progress Report on
Sub-Saharan Africa", has recognized this and is much more explicit than the
Agenda on the political commmitments needed for devaluation to have an
impact.71
Nonprice Incentives
Critics of the Agenda's focus on price policy raise several alternative
nonprice incentives for increasing agricultural output, all aimed at
ameliorating debilitating structural constraints. Although the Agenda
mentions the potential contribution of improved input availability, research
and extension services, and adequate transportation and storage facilities,
its treatment is deemed "superficial" by critics, particularly relative to the
extensive attention given price incentives. Kenneth Shapiro especially
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emphasizes the need for increased information and available appropriate
technology. Research and extension services must be developed to reduce the
current deficiency in both of these areas.72 Although discussed in the
Agenda, both remain inadequately connected with its discussion of incentives
to production.
Caroline Allison and Reginald Green emphasize the need for accessible
health care and education, and for a reduction of productive time spent in
gathering fuelwood and water. These time and resource constraints, they point
out, reduce farm efficiency and output regardless of producer prices. Allison
and Green are among those who criticize the Agenda's suggestion that partial
user-charges should be adopted for health and other public services.73 They
feel that it would result in a curtailment of services in rural areas and thus
serve to hinder growth in agricultural productivity. Colclough takes up the
same argument, "evidence suggests that...cost covering charges...will result
in large numbers of rural families being unable or unwilling to use such
services." The policy would result, he states, in "a reduction in the
quantity and quality of services available to rural populations." 74
It seems to us that the critics are on weak ground on this point. First,
Colclough's reference to "evidence" is not only unsubstantiated but
unsubstantiable given the extremely limited experience with user-charges in
Africa. More importantly, the critics seem to imply that health and education
services are being currently provided in a widespread way at no charge. But
they are not. The point of the Agenda's recommendation is to ease the burden
of these services on government budgets so that they can be distributed more
widely than is currently the case. If governments could recover half the
costs, they could provide double the services at the same level of budgetary
expenditure. Special subsidies could be made available to the very poor. The
implication by critics that the Agenda favors cutting rural services is simply
not there.
CAN THE AGENDA BE IMPLEMENTED?
While the Agenda devotes most of its energy to overall economic strategy
and particular economic policies, it does pay some attention to the problem of
implementation. In general, it advocates strengthening the role of the
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private sector and consolidating the tasks of government into more manageable
units. It advocates making parastatal organizations operate more along the
lines of commercial enterprises. The Agenda also focuses on the need for
improving the quality of planning and increasing its impact on actual policy
outcomes. But, in general, the Agenda is not nearly as detailed on this set
of issues as it is on those themes discussed earlier in this paper; perhaps
ten pages of the document are given to problems of implementation. A number
of critics have wondered why the Agenda pays so little attention to questions
of implementation. They make the point that balancing conflicting economic
priorities in Sub-Saharan Africa is particularly difficult given the lack of
skilled manpower and monetary resources. In addition, major systemic
complications -- political demands and constraints, poor administrative
mechanisms and the lack of effective infrastructure to make decisions
operational -- threaten economic management. These systemic constraints are
not given sufficient attention in the Bank's prescriptions for reform. While
much is made of short-term political constraints and general political
fragility, little space is devoted to their analysis.
Those who criticize the Agenda on implementation questions are themselves
divided into two groups. Some see these problems as part and parcel of the
overall inadequacy and wrong-headedness of the Agenda. Thus, Allison and
Green describe the Agenda as an attempt to apply "pure" economic calculations
to a complex set of political economic realities. This approach, they feel,
stems from the Bank's historical inability to deal with noneconomic
realities. Manfred Bienefeld feels that the very notion of "general"
solutions, independent of politics, is untenable. To effectively implement
any policy recommendations, the Agenda must address first the objectives of
government, and secondly, the political forces which they represent. By
taking a purely economic approach, says Bienefeld, the Agenda fails to
confront the issue of political context which determines control in African
states. 7 5
Economic vs. Political Rationality
But others who criticize the implementation approach of the Agenda do so
because they believe that it threatens to make inoperable or impractical an
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otherwise basically useful diagnosis of Africa's problems. The most important
of these critics is David Leonard. Leonard agrees with the Agenda's finding
of consistently poor performance in African public sectors. But Leonard feels
that the answer to why this is the case lies less in mistaken policies than it
does in Africa's sociopolitical context. For example:
The economic and political costs of creating marketing boards which
effectively tax agriculture are more than offset by the political
benefits of the jobs and "free goods" which they indirectly
finance. 7 6
The Agenda, according to Leonard, is not sufficiently attuned to Africa's
political realities. Decisions which affect the size and role of the public
sector are based on patronage and political returns.
Political rationality, by itself, is not necessarily bad. The problem in
Africa is that political rationality has become antagonistic to economic
growth and productivity. Leonard sees as futile any attempt to impose the
primacy of economic rationality, given the political rationality of African
states. Policies are needed that respond to political rationality but have
economic payoffs in terms of growth and productivity.
Leonard makes a parallel argument about planning. The Agenda's emphasis
on the need for better economic planning, improved management techniques, and
a smaller public sector rest on an assumption that mismanagement stems from
poor economic planning. Leonard argues that, on the contrary, mismanagement
results from the political infeasibility of plan implementation. If this is
the case, the Agenda fails to provide an approach which addresses the root of
the malfunction, simply providing another blueprint to "fix" mismanagement.
Leonard points out that empirical knowledge of successful management
techniques in the African context is scarce, a fact which the Agenda doesn't
really acknowledge.
We find Leonard's point to be basically compelling, though perhaps some of
its implications are overstated. That the Agenda was politically obtuse was
largely a function of its status as a World 'Bank document (though, as stated
earlier, the political implications of at least some of the suggested reforms
are stated much less ambiguously in the recent Bank "update"). Leonard
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perhaps overstates the degree to which, at least in some countries, the kinds
of policies and institutions the Agenda criticizes serve even political
rationality. The case of the marketing boards in Tanzania and Madagascar,
discussed earlier, would be examples. But even these specific cases may
verify Leonard's broader point. Perhaps reform was put on the agenda and was
possible in these countries because the old ways no longer had political
payoffs. Leonard is also too pessimistic about the possibility of changing
the mix between public and private sectors. While the point he makes about
the pervasiveness of political rationality is valid, he tends to reify it into
something immutable.
Joel Barkan's critique is in some ways parallel to Leonard's. He points
to the Bank's lack of attention to administrative and organizational
mechanisms required to implement the Agenda's prescriptions, and its reliance
on macroeconomic solutions to fundamentally micro-organizational problems.
Barkan believes that effective microorganizational options have been ignored
by the Bank, especially small-scale peasant-operated organizations, which have
proven to be effective instruments of development. Barkan refers to Kenya's
harambee organizations as illustrations. He fears that the Bank's concern
with structural adjustment and macro-organizational matters will preclude it
from having an impact on local level organizations which he sees as necessary
for successful implementation of solutions.
Conditionality
One of the methods that the Agenda implicitly proposes as a means of
implementation (though to what degree is unclear) is conditionality. The
viability of this has been questioned. Both Reginald Green, from the left,
and Peter Kilby, from the right, stress the importance of governments and
policymakers really believing in reforms for those measures to be successful.
This leads both to question the utility of conditionality as a means of
influencing policy, although for Green the implication is that more aid should
be given without conditions while Kilby thinks that more aid is likely to be
wasted and shouldn't be offered at all. But conditionality could prove to be
an asset to those African governments who see the need for reform but fear its
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political consequences. These leaders might be able to use conditionality to
deflect the political heat arising from tough decisions away from themselves
and on to the "foreign devils" from the World Bank and the IMF. These
arguments are difficult to evaluate and can only be judged over time. They do
point up, however, the many potential difficulties that implementing the
Agenda's strategy may entail.
CONCLUSION
In the final chapter of a recent Scandanavian book of essays concerning
Africa's economic crisis, a leading international expert on African
development issues described the broad lines of a strategy that would
hopefully help alleviate current conditions. The expert emphasized that
Africa's crisis is in a crisis of production and that solutions must be
directed towards increasing output and productivity. He stated that African
governments need to consolidate, both in terms of emphasizing the completion
of existing projects and the rehabilitation of existing productive capacity,
and in terms of giving priorities to tasks that they are capable of
undertaking while avoiding those that they are not. He particularly
emphasized the absolute necessity of generating export earnings and vilified
those who have accused him of favoring "neocolonialism" for such an approach.
He stressed the crucial need for cooperation between African governments and
the international community if a way out of the crisis is to be found. 7 8
This sounds as if the expert might have been Elliot Berg, chief author of
the World Bank's Agenda, on another of his globetrotting tours. But, in fact,
it was Reginald Green, editor of the IDS Bulletin critique of the World Bank's
Agenda. Have Berg and Green, who have been directly and indirectly debating
each other on African development issues for nearly twenty years, suddenly
come to a meeting of the minds? Not really. In the same essay, Green repeats
many of his criticisims of the Agenda. Rather, the point is that the dialogue
engendered by the appearance of the Agenda, despite some nastiness, has not;
been one of the deaf . President Nyerere of Tanzania, the individual most
responsible for popularizing the notion of self-reliant, broad-based
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development that led to policies geared towards import-substituting
industrialization, stated last May (1983) that,
We may have been too ready to assume...that factories or large
investments of different kinds would provide us with wealth...We have
to recognize that, at least for us in Africa, 'development' and
'rural development' are in reality synonymous. 7 9
In the 1980's African countries absolutely need reform. The old ways of
doing things are no longer viable. Government budgetary deficits cannot
continue to skyrocket; balance of payments deficits must be reduced; more food
must be grown to feed the continent's expanding population; scarce resources
-- both financial, human and physical -- must be used more efficiently and
effectively. The importance of the World Bank's Agenda was to state this very
clearly and forcefully; to promote debate and discussion on how this might
best be done. The Agenda's importance also lies in its stating that the
primary responsibility lies with Africa's governments. Despite the Agenda's
underestimation of external factors in causing the current crisis, it played a
useful role by clearly breaking with the tendency of international reports on
Africa to focus on external constraints and downplay the culpability of
African governments. The international context for African economic
development in the 1980's will continue to be adverse; that is all the more
reason why African governments must do a better job. Dreams for the future
must be grounded in the. reality of the present or they will never go beyond
being dreams. The World Bank's Agenda will likely be seen in the future as an
important step in moving beyond the guilt-based relationship between Africa
and the international development community that marked the first two decades
of independent rule.
Summarizing the Debate
In this essay we have reviewed the main points of the Agenda and have
discussed a wide range of criticisms that have been directed against it. We
have found many of the criticisms to be either not substantiated or based upon
misreadings of the Agenda. We have found several critical points, including
some very important ones, to be basically well-taken. We have not dealt with
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all of the points made in the Agenda -- nor all of the criticisms -- but have
provided a broad picture of the differences between the World Bank and its
critics. To summarize, we will briefly lay out what we have found to be weak
criticisms and what we believe are criticisms that raise important problems in
the World Bank's Agenda.
We basically disagree with those critics who feel that:
1) the Agenda implies a clear repudiation of the "Basic Human Needs"
approach and a return to a strategy based upon "trickle down";
2) the Agenda is inherently antagonistic to Africa's long-range goals as
articulated in the Lagos Plan of Action;
3) external factors are the fundamental explanation for Africa's current
economic crisis;
4) the Agenda is wrong in its negative characterization of public sector
performance in Africa;
5) the Agenda's focus on agriculture is overstated;
6) expanding export earnings is either not needed or impossible to
achieve and thus should not be attempted;
7) the Agenda's strategy is in conflict with Africa's priority of food
self-sufficiency;
8) allocating certain sectors to private initiative would involve either
the tasks not being performed or being performed primarily by foreigners;
9) the Agenda's proposals imply a reduction in services to the rural
areas.
Not all of the criticisms of the World Bank Agenda are off-base. The
document has, it seems to us, important flaws. In particular, critics have
pinpointed six areas in which the Agenda has real problems. First, the Agenda
is in general overly optimistic; to entitle a report on Africa in the early
1980's "Accelerated Development" is a bad joke. Specifically, the Agenda is
too optimistic about the international trade environment that African exports
face -- and the possibility of export-led growth -- and about the likelihood
of increased development assistance. Second, the Agenda underestimates the
impact of external factors on Africa's crisis. We earlier disagreed with
critics who see international factors as primary; they are not, nor are they
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marginal as the Agenda states. Third, the Agenda has a tendency to
overgeneralize. This is true both of the outcomes between countries and of
the degree to which policies are similar. Price distortions, in particular,
are not so general as the Agenda implies. Fourth, the Agenda's policy
recommendations are too narrowly cast. In particular, the emphasis on trade
and exchange rate policy is overstated. Fifth, the Agenda broadly pays too
little attention to political issues and political constraints. Careful
attention is not given to the budgetary implications of proposed reforms.
Sixth, too little attention is paid to what are likely to be very serious
problems in implementing the reforms suggested in the Agenda.
Just as critics of the World Bank, despite harsh rhetoric, appear to have
responded constructively to many of the ideas in the Agenda, so too has the
Bank taken its critics into account. The Bank's "Progress Report on African
Development," issued in late 1983, makes concessions on several of the
criticisms just mentioned. It recognizes, for example, that export-led growth
may not be viable and more explicitly faces the political constraints to
reform. It agrees that any long-term strategy must go beyond "taking into
account" present constraints to actively overcoming them. 8 0
An Historical Parallel
Finally, we might look at the Agenda in the broader perspective of the
evolution of thinking about economic development in Africa. Those familiar
with late colonial history in East Africa share a feeling of d6jq vu in
following the debate between the Agenda and its critics. In 1952, the
Governor of Kenya Colony, Sir Philip Mitchell, facing what was a mutually
reinforcing economic and political crisis that included the emerging Mau Mau
rebellion, addressed a long memo to his superiors at the British Colonial
Office proposing that a Royal Commission of Inquiry be sent to East Africa to
examine its economic problems and suggest solutions.8 The Report of the
East African Royal Commission, issued in 1955, was highly critical of previous
government priorities and policies. In particular, the Report criticized of
the lack of attention given to African agriculture and the role of government
controls that pervaded the economy. The Commission began from the assumption
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that market incentives could best stimulate all parts of the economy and that
success would depend upon "the integration of the African rural population
into the world economy." 8 2  The Report was a blueprint for a new kind of
society free from both racial segregation and bureaucratic management. (The
Economist entitled'its editorial on the Report, "Adam Smith in Africa"). 8 3
The response of the Kenya colonial government to the Report was highly
critical. Sir Evelyn Baring, who had replaced Mitchell as Governor, defended
the necessity of active state intervention in the economy and was fearful
about the political impact of too rapid a change in policy. On the other
hand, the Kenya government had already begun to implement many of the specific
suggestions of the Report, especially those concerned with expanding African
agricultural output through dramatically improving the incentive structure for
African peasants. Political rationality and fragility precluded the
acceptance of the logic of "purposive economic rationality" in late colonial
Kenya. But, important reform did occur and with it, a significant impact.
While the "agricultural revolution" that the Royal Commission forsaw didn't
take place, small-holder production rapidly increased and the policy reforms
of the late colonial period served as the basis for the relatively successful
Kenyan agricultural policy in the independence era. Plus ga change, plus
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